The Securities and Exchange Commission proposed on November 13 the first comprehensive overhaul of executive compensation disclosure since 2006, and the rule was published in the Federal Register on November 19. The proposal would shrink the number of executives whose pay must be disclosed, replace the main compensation tables, raise the threshold for reporting perquisites, and simplify the pay-versus-performance and pay-ratio disclosures.

The comment period runs 60 days, with comments due by January 19, 2027. The rule is a proposal, not a final rule, and the SEC can change it before adopting anything. The direction, though, is clear: the agency wants a principles-based regime that focuses on material information and reduces the compliance burden that has built up over two decades.

What changes

The most visible change is the number of named executive officers. The proposal limits the group to the principal executive officer and the principal financial officer, typically two people, down from the current five or more in many companies. The compensation of other executives would be disclosed only if it is material.

The Summary Compensation Table and the other primary tables would be replaced by three new tables, Gibson Dunn summarized,: a Granted Compensation Table, an Earned Compensation Table, and a Status of Equity Awards Table, plus narrative disclosure. The design is meant to separate what a company granted from what an executive earned, a distinction that has become muddied in the current format.

The Compensation Discussion and Analysis would be refocused on three topics: the company's compensation objectives and how they connect to strategy, the material elements of compensation and how they were determined, and the consideration of say-on-pay results if applicable. The current CD&A is longer and more variable; the proposal wants a tighter narrative.

How the disclosure grew

The current regime is a product of accretion. The SEC's 2006 overhaul set the basic table structure. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 added say-on-pay, the pay ratio, pay-versus-performance, and clawback requirements, and the agency adopted those rules over the following decade. Each addition answered a specific concern, and each added pages to the proxy.

The result is a document that few investors read in full and that companies spend months preparing. The proposal is an attempt to step back and ask what the disclosure is for. The answer it offers is material information about how executives are paid and how that pay connects to performance, delivered in a form that is easier to read and cheaper to produce.

The history also explains the resistance. Each of the Dodd-Frank disclosures was fought over, and each has constituencies that use it. The pay ratio is used by labor groups and researchers. Pay-versus-performance is used by proxy advisers. The tables are used by compensation consultants and academics. Simplifying them takes something away from each of those groups.

The perquisite threshold

The proposal raises the aggregate threshold for reporting perquisites from $10,000 to $150,000. It also excludes de minimis fringe benefits from the threshold calculation and revises the guidance on when a benefit is "integrally and directly related" to the performance of an executive's duties.

The change would remove a large volume of small items from proxy statements. It would also simplify the judgment calls that produce much of the legal review, because the threshold is a bright line and the de minimis exclusion removes a category of items from the calculation altogether. It would also reduce the visibility of benefits that fall below the new threshold, which is the tradeoff investors will weigh. A $150,000 threshold is high enough that some benefits previously disclosed would become invisible in the standard table.

Pay versus performance

The pay-versus-performance disclosure would change in several ways. "Compensation Actually Paid" would be replaced by the Earned Compensation Table total. Only cumulative total shareholder return would be required, rather than the current set of measures. The lookback period would be cut from five years to three, and the disclosure would cover only the principal executive officer and principal financial officer.

The proposal's logic, Sullivan & Cromwell noted, is that the current disclosure is complex and produces numbers that are hard to compare. The counterargument is that the current metrics were designed to answer a specific question: whether pay aligns with performance. Simplifying the table may make it easier to read and less informative at the same time.

Pay ratio and other changes

The pay-ratio disclosure would draw the median employee from U.S. full-time employees, excluding seasonal and temporary workers, and require re-identification every five years instead of every three. The change would reduce the compliance work and change the population the ratio describes.

The proposal also eliminates the Director Compensation Table in favor of materiality-based disclosure, replaces quantified termination and change-in-control disclosure with a qualitative discussion, streamlines the golden parachute table, reduces clawback disclosure, removes the 10-K, 20-F, and 40-F cover-page check boxes, and eliminates the Item 402(s) risk disclosure and the Item 402(x) option-timing disclosure. Long-form registration statements would get 120 days for Item 402 disclosure.

The investor view

Institutional investors and proxy advisers rely on the standardized tables to compare pay across companies. A principles-based regime gives companies more discretion, and discretion can make comparison harder. The proposal keeps three tables, which preserves some standardization, but the move from five named officers to two reduces the number of data points available.

The investor argument is not that every table is useful. It is that the tables are the only consistent source of data the market has. A company that discloses a narrative about its compensation philosophy is telling investors what it thinks matters. A table lets investors decide for themselves.

The counterargument is that the current tables are so complex that investors rely on the summary metrics anyway. The proposal's design tries to keep the useful parts and cut the rest. Whether it succeeds will depend on the final rule and on how companies implement it.

The compliance cost

The cost of the current regime falls on public companies, and it falls hardest on smaller ones. A proxy statement requires input from legal, finance, human resources, and outside advisers. The tables have to be tied to the company's books, and the narrative has to be reviewed for consistency with the numbers.

The proposal's cost savings are part of its appeal. Fewer named officers, simpler tables, a higher perquisite threshold, and a longer re-identification cycle for the pay ratio all reduce work. The SEC's economic analysis will be part of the comment record, and companies will describe their own costs in their letters.

The savings come with a risk. A regime that relies more on narrative and judgment can produce disclosure that is less consistent across companies. The SEC's review process and the comment file are the place where that tradeoff will be tested.

The three tables

The new tables are the proposal's structural core. The Granted Compensation Table would show what the company awarded in a given year. The Earned Compensation Table would show what the executive earned, including the value of equity that vested. The Status of Equity Awards Table would show the outstanding awards and their terms.

The separation is meant to solve a confusion in the current Summary Compensation Table, which mixes granted and earned values in a way that can mislead. A grant of stock options, for example, is reported at grant-date fair value even if the executive never realizes that value. The new structure would put the grant in one table and the realized value in another.

Whether the three tables are clearer than the current format will depend on the definitions and the footnotes. The proposal leaves those details to the release, and the comment period will test whether they work.

The debate

Supporters of the proposal argue that the current regime has become a compliance exercise that produces pages of data investors do not use. They point to the cost of preparing the tables, the difficulty of comparing companies, and the way the disclosure has expanded beyond its original purpose.

Critics argue that the standardized tables are what make comparison possible. A principles-based regime gives companies more discretion, and discretion can produce disclosure that is less complete and harder to compare across issuers. The proposal's own design tries to address that concern by keeping three tables and a narrative, but the tension is real.

The SEC's commissioners will hear both arguments in the comment file. The rule is likely to be revised before adoption, and the final version may differ on the details that matter most, including the perquisite threshold and the treatment of pay-versus-performance.

What happens next

The comment period runs until January 19, 2027. The SEC will review the letters, revise the proposal, and adopt a final rule, probably in 2027. The final rule will include compliance dates, and companies will have a transition period to adjust their proxy processes.

The proposal could also change in response to political developments. The SEC's composition and priorities can shift, and a change in leadership can change the direction of a rule. The current proposal reflects the commission's view that the disclosure regime needs simplification. A future commission could take a different view.

For companies, the practical work starts now. The comment period is the chance to shape the details, and the details are where the costs and the benefits sit.

What companies should watch

The first question is the definition of the named executive officer group. A company that currently discloses five executives may need to change its processes, its controls, and its proxy preparation. The second is the new table structure, which will require new data collection and new review procedures.

The third is the perquisite threshold. Companies will need to decide how to track benefits below $150,000 and how to explain them in narrative form. The fourth is the pay-versus-performance change, which affects the metrics, the lookback, and the comparison group.

The comment period is the opportunity to shape those details. Companies, investors, and proxy advisers all have an interest in the outcome, and the SEC's final rule will set the disclosure baseline for years.

A simpler rulebook with less data

The proposal is a bet that less standardized data, paired with a clearer narrative, will produce better disclosure. That bet may be right for the largest companies, whose pay programs are complex and whose investors have analysts to interpret them. It may be wrong for smaller companies and for investors who rely on the tables to compare pay across the market.

The SEC will decide. For now, the rulebook is open for comment, and the companies that will live under it have until January 19 to make their case.

Primary sources

  1. SEC proposed rule, Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform, File No. S7-2026-39, for the proposal's text and release numbers.
  2. Federal Register, 91 FR 75002, November 19, 2026, for the publication date, comment deadline, and rule summary.
  3. Gibson Dunn, for the analysis of the proposed changes to Item 402 and the new tables.
  4. Sullivan & Cromwell, for the comparison with the current disclosure regime.