Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Friday that four agencies had pushed for months to blacklist a Singapore-based firm at the center of the Nvidia export case, and that the decision sat with the Commerce Department, which did not act.

Speaking on CNBC, Bessent said Treasury, the Defense Department, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the State Department had favored adding Megaspeed International to the export-entity list. He said Commerce controlled the decision, using a phrase that has become the shorthand for the dispute: "But Commerce has the pen."

The remark was a rare public rebuke of one Cabinet secretary by another. It came a day after Jensen Huang stepped down as Nvidia's chief executive, and as Congress prepared to question both Huang and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick about how a firm suspected of diverting advanced chips to China stayed off the blacklist.

What Megaspeed is

Megaspeed is a Singapore-based company that bought Nvidia processors for data centers in Southeast Asia. According to the reporting, it traded more than $4 billion of Nvidia chips over two years, and U.S. officials suspect that some of those processors were routed onward to China despite export restrictions.

The case turns on the difference between a sale and a diversion. Nvidia sells chips to distributors and data-center operators around the world. Export controls restrict what can go to China and at what performance level. A company in a third country can buy legal chips and, according to U.S. officials, pass them to a prohibited end user. The entity list is the tool the government uses to cut off a company it believes is doing that.

The list is administered by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security under the Export Administration Regulations. Adding a company requires a determination that it poses a risk to national security or foreign policy, and it triggers a licensing requirement for exports to that company. In practice, the interagency process involves State, Defense, Treasury, and the intelligence community. One agency holds the pen, but the decision is supposed to reflect the consensus. When the consensus is that a company should be listed, the failure to list becomes a policy choice rather than an administrative delay.

The reporting says Megaspeed's volumes were large enough that the question became whether the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, which enforces export controls, should have acted sooner.

The performance threshold matters. The H100 is the generation of Nvidia accelerators at the center of the export debate: powerful enough for advanced AI training, restricted for China, and valuable enough that a gray market exists for chips that can reach it. Nvidia has said it complies with export controls. The question in the Megaspeed case is whether its distributors and customers did.

The blacklist that did not happen

The dispute is not about whether Megaspeed should have been listed. Bessent said the interagency group had agreed on that for months. The dispute is about why the listing did not happen and who is responsible.

Bessent said President Trump had made clear that China should not receive Nvidia chips above the H100 level, a threshold that separates the most advanced accelerators from older generations. He also said enforcement steps had been signed off at the top and not carried out. Axios reported that Trump approved enforcement measures over suspected chip diversions at least three times this year, and that Lutnick did not follow through.

Commerce has not offered a detailed account of its internal process. A department spokeswoman, Kristen Eichamer, confirmed that Lutnick will testify before the Senate Banking Committee. The department has not responded publicly to Bessent's specific allegation about the timing of the blacklist.

Bessent declined to discuss a reported confrontation with Lutnick in the Situation Room. He said he does not repeat conversations held there.

The resignation

Jensen Huang stepped down as Nvidia's chief executive on Thursday. In a letter to employees dated Nov. 8, he acknowledged an affair outside his marriage. U.S. outlets identified the other person as Alice Huang, a former Megaspeed director who is not related to Jensen Huang, and reported that U.S. intelligence suspects her of being a Chinese intelligence asset.

China's government rejected the espionage claim. Nvidia's board plans to examine the matter. Three congressional committee chairs want Jensen Huang to appear at a private briefing in Washington on Nov. 18.

The resignation turned a regulatory case into a corporate governance one. Nvidia is one of the most valuable companies in the world and a central supplier to the artificial intelligence buildout. The board now has to explain what it knew about the relationship and when, and whether the company's compliance systems flagged the Megaspeed connection before reporters did.

The board's review will run alongside the congressional one, and the two will feed each other. A board that clears the company's compliance systems will face questions about why the systems missed a customer that U.S. intelligence had flagged. A board that faults them will face questions about what the current leadership knew.

Bessent argued that the focus on Huang's personal life had crowded out the more important question. He said the issue is whether Nvidia knew its customer and made a serious effort to prevent leakage, including sales to what he called obviously pass-through shell companies. He described a lot of leakage in the system and said accountability could extend to executives who knew about customers.

Nvidia's compliance obligations do not end with its own sales. Export controls apply to the chain of distribution, and companies are expected to know their customers and to screen for red flags, including intermediaries that appear to have no business purpose beyond passing goods along. The Commerce Department's enforcement guidance calls this a know-your-customer duty. If a distributor was buying billions of dollars of chips for customers that could not be verified, the question is what Nvidia's systems did with that signal.

The Cabinet fight

Public disputes between Cabinet secretaries are unusual, and this one landed in the middle of a policy fight that had been conducted privately for months. The Treasury Department and Commerce Department have overlapping roles in economic policy but different jurisdictions over export controls. Commerce runs the licensing and enforcement machinery. Treasury runs sanctions and financial intelligence.

That division is why the "Commerce has the pen" line matters. It is an accusation that the department with the authority declined to use it, and a signal that other agencies believe the decision was not driven by a lack of evidence.

Lutnick has denied speculation that he might leave the administration, calling the rumors silly. The White House has said Trump maintains confidence in him, according to CNN. But the public criticism from a fellow Cabinet member gives the story a durability that a routine agency dispute would not have.

Congress moves

The Senate Banking Committee, chaired by Tim Scott, has invited Jensen Huang to testify on Dec. 3 and asked Lutnick to appear in December as well. The invitation to Huang is voluntary, though Scott has said a subpoena is possible. Senator Jim Banks, an Indiana Republican, had sought a prompt hearing, citing bipartisan concerns.

Lutnick has committed to appear. Three congressional committees have sought records related to the case, and Democrats have asked that documents be preserved. The private briefing for committee chairs on Nov. 18 will come before the public hearing.

The hearing will give lawmakers a chance to ask the questions the public dispute has raised: when did Commerce learn about Megaspeed, what did the intelligence community tell it, who signed off on the delay, and what did Nvidia know about its customer.

The public timeline is compressed. The affair became public in early November; Huang's resignation letter was dated Nov. 8; he stepped down on Nov. 12; Bessent's interview was Nov. 13; the private briefing is Nov. 18; the Senate hearing is expected in December. Each step has produced a new account of who knew what, and the accounts have not converged.

A Senate hearing is a fact-finding exercise, not a prosecution. Lutnick can be asked under oath about the timing of the blacklist; Huang can be asked what he knew about Megaspeed and Alice Huang. The committee can subpoena documents and refer matters for criminal investigation, but it cannot itself impose penalties. Its main power is publicity, and in a case that has already produced a CEO's resignation and a public Cabinet fight, publicity is not a small thing.

What the case tests

Nvidia's position makes the case more than a personnel story. Its accelerators are the scarce input for AI data centers, and its sales to China and to intermediaries have been a recurring point of friction between the company and the government. Every restriction shifts revenue, and every loophole invites a new enforcement action. The Megaspeed case is a test of whether the distribution chain can be policed at the scale the market now operates.

The Megaspeed case is also a test of how export controls work when the technology is scarce, the demand is global, and the companies involved are among the most important in the economy. The rules depend on enforcement, and enforcement depends on the agency with the pen using it.

It is also a test of accountability beyond the CEO. Jensen Huang's resignation resolved the personal question but not the corporate one. Nvidia's board, its compliance officers, and the distributors that sold the chips all sit somewhere on the chain that ended with advanced processors in the wrong hands, if the allegations are correct.

The Senate hearing will not settle those questions, and the Cabinet dispute may not be resolved by testimony. But the case has already changed the terms of the argument. A blacklist that was supposed to be routine became a public test of whether the Commerce Department would act on its own intelligence, and the answer, according to the Treasury Secretary, is that it did not.

The pen is still at Commerce. The question now is who will be held to how it was used.

Primary sources

  1. Irish Times, "Bessent points finger at Lutnick as Nvidia row ignites Washington blame game," Nov. 13, 2026.
  2. NZ Herald, "Political fallout widens in Nvidia spy scandal," Nov. 14, 2026.
  3. Econotimes, "Senate Panel Invites Former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang to Testify," Nov. 2026.
  4. CNBC, "Squawk Box" interview with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Nov. 13, 2026.